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About Radovan Geist

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Author Bio: Radovan Geist’s professional life spans the media and academic world. He is Editor-in-Chief of EurActiv.sk; he teaches part-time at the Commenius University in Bratislava, and he works as a researcher at the Institute of Political Science of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. “European integration has come to a stage where it needs to improve dramatically its co-ordination, communication and citizen involvement. There is no “miraculous solution”, only gradual, step-by-step work that needs to be made to overcome these deficits. MyParl can be a useful contributor to better information and idea exchange, more intense contact, and fruitful debates among the people’s representatives on the regional, national and European level. Online solutions have already revolutionized communication of “average citizens”; it’s now high time that the political class learns to use them for the benefit of democracy.”

Articles by Radovan Geist

Moral of Dzurinda´s story

Posted by Radovan Geist on 05/02/10

„Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico’s chances of winning a June 12 general election rose on Monday when his main rival, center-right ex-premier Mikulas Dzurinda, pulled out over accusations of money laundering“, writes Reuters, and repeats Financial Times, EurActiv.com and couple of others.

In fact that might not be the case. Not that Mr Fico would not win the next elections – with steady support of 30 – 40 percent in polls, and other contenders way back behind, Smer-SD is on the best way to decide about the next government. But if anything, the pull-out of Mr Dzurinda could make this victory more difficult. Given the catastrophic results of SDKU in recent polls (see for example here or even here), low personal ratings of Mikulas Dzurinda and his divisive image in his own party and opposition camp, a new leader on top of the (still) strongest opposition party could at least increase chances for better results. There are several morals to this story.

First, it is important to know your “point of departure”. Even if you are not among the Dzurinda´s admirers, you have to admit that he played an important role in modern Slovak history. The precise mixture of political skills, historical coincidence and sheer luck is a point of discussion, but the undeniable fact remains – he happened to be the PM when Slovakia entered the EU. His problem was that he started to believe in his own “historical predestination” to lead Slovakia to brighter future: First he “defeated Meciar”. Then he led Slovakia to European family. Then he made the small country into the “economic tiger”. Then he´d save it from Fico… I suppose, for Dzurinda it was difficult to admit that the picture he painted of himself is flaking.

Second, Slovak politics is highly personalised. Relations between the government and the opposition were in the last few years driven not so much by conflict between two strongest political parties – Smer-SD and SDKU (and even less by conflicting ideologies) – as by personal conflict between Fico and Dzurinda. The result could have been expected from the beginning. Dzurinda´d lost not only because he is a less able politician (in his rhetoric, his ability to appeal to “common man”, etc.) but also because he is much a product of the past. Dzurinda once used to personalise an idea of Slovakia, firmly belonging to the West. Now when the difficult questions of “Meciarism”, EU membership, etc seem to be solved, he is not able to appeal to voters.

Third, Fico will have to be more careful. The secret of the continuous popularity of his party – with all the scandals, cases of misgovernment, and difficult coalition partners – lies also in the impotence of the opposition politicians. Fico knew how to fight Dzurinda and therefore he was happy to have him on top in SDKU. Now the situation may change.

Last but not least, recent revelations of shady financial dealings of SDKU (but also other political parties before) teach the already cynical public another lesson. Fico may win the next elections, or opposition may score better than now expected, but they will face growing public distrust of the mainstream politics.

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In one year, without any nail, no bell-tower

Posted by Radovan Geist on 02/12/09

When Leopold I. Habsburg in 1861 allowed Protestants in Hungary to build their own churches, he could not expect that he would have such brave followers. But now, it´s not the conflict between Catholics and Protestants, which tears Europe (unless we subscribe to highly unsustainable rationalisation of the conflict on the north-western periphery of our continent), but the existence of sinister Muslims, who are allowed to clean our toilets, build our cities, bake kebabs, and stuff our banks with petrodollars, but are not allowed to call to their prayers from minarets in our alleged “homeland”.

During the last weekend the Swiss (or a majority of the majority that bothered to vote) decide that they do not want any new minarets in their country. Officials hurried to stress that the five-percent Muslim minority is still welcome (even if the Swiss People´s Party representatives leave little doubts that the “still” should be in fact substituted with “for now”). But the fact is that the citizens of the alleged show-case of European democracy decided to make the practicing Muslims´ lives yet another bit more unpleasant – first the muezzins on minarets were forbidden; now there should be no new, obviously useless, minarets.

Maybe at the end we will see that the Swiss would overcome their historical animosity and get inspired even more by the Leopold I. Habsburg’s Articules from 1681. Those have wholeheartedly allowed Protestants, living under the major protectors of Catholicism, to build churches; they gave just few conditions: churches must be built on the margin of village or town, have to be build in one year, completely made of wood, without using any nails, on very low stone basis, without any bell-tower, and with a gate not facing the street… – surely a nice shopping list, offering lots of inspiration for any extremist. The problem is that Leopold´s Articules were really wholehearted compared to the Swiss referendum – they were granting the religious minority freedoms, which it did not have before, not vice versa.

The result of the voting surely cheered hearts of all European right extremists, who might have problems to unite on something, but are always happy to unite against something (or even better, somebody). Duch Freedom Party (let us not be mistaken, another infamous party from the European history had in its name “socialist” a “workers´”, without any correlation to its real politics) have already said that “what is possible in Switzerland, could be possible also here” (meaning, in the historical stronghold of the European religious tolerance). That´s exactly the point! Far right has really “iron” logic. If Switzerland could forbid minarets, so could the Netherlands. The United Kingdom does not have to stay back. And Polish could forbid stone synagogues. And Turkish could restrict Christian churches with towers. In Slovakia, we have already made registration of any “Muslim church” impossible by law, so we are safe.

Habsburg counter-reformation did not bring Protestants in Hungary on the “right path to God”. On the contrary, they have fought on hundred years of bloody civil wars to get their rights set in Leopold´s Articules. Europe was never too much bothered by the consistency of its words and deeds (in this case, on tolerance and human rights). But it should be at least bothered by the history lessons.

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EU enlargement: Will get back to you…

Posted by Radovan Geist on 19/10/09

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A long way to go for Mr Obama

Posted by Radovan Geist on 14/10/09

Mr Turk in his blog-post on Nobel Peace Price writes: “They do not give Oscars for promises of good movies”. Rightly said; President Obama won that price mostly for what he promises (to be more precise – what the awarding committee believes, he promises) to the world peace, not for what he´d done. I say mostly, because in light of his predecessor´s foreign policy, Obama first contribution to the world peace and brotherhood of mankind was simply winning those elections. Building on Mr Turk´s metaphor: They might be inclined to give Oscar for promises of good movie, if for eight years they are forced to watch the worst movie ever. (I thank for this suggestion to my colleague Zuzana Gabrizova.) Paradoxically enough, Mr Obama could thank for this price (as well as for his popularity abroad) largely to his predecessor and his catastrophic policies.

But will he meet the expectations? Let´s say we won´t question that he wants to deliver. But I would be much less optimistic about what he really can deliver to the expecting international community. There are several reasons:

First it is a matter of political energy and time. Obama was not elected, and could not hope to be re-elected, on the foreign policy grounds. He has inherited a country with serious economic problems and a socially divided society. His attempt to reform the health system shows that solving this might take much more time and energy than expected.

Secondly, the US foreign policy is not governed (only) by the President´s plans and wishes, but also by institutional and policy limitations and interests of internal pressure groups, which do not change as fast as the boss in the White House. The situation in Afghanistan, but also in Iraq, prison camp in Guantanamo, etc, shows strong persistence of embedded interests. Changes might not be as fast or as thorough as expected. Let us see how far we can get from “Yes he wants” to “Yes he can”.

English, Foreign Affairs
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Ghosts from the past

Posted by Radovan Geist on 12/10/09

The Czech president has finally showed his cards. He will not ratify the Lisbon Treaty, unless the Czech Republic gets opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The official reason – Klaus believes that the Charter will give the Sudeten Germans the opportunity to claim back the properties they have lost after being forcefully “resettled” (a euphemism for “being expelled”) after WWII on the basis of Benes Decrees. Klaus´s move could be explained in three ways.

The first possibility is that Klaus really is a kind of modern Ján Žižka, Hussites´ leader defending the Czech sovereignty against malicious machinations of eurobureaucrats and crypto-socialists. His condition should only help to hold back the ratification process until next spring, when Tories win the UK elections, and organise referendum on the Treaty. Its result will be most probably negative. Even if it is unclear, how the new UK government could take back its signature from already ratified Treaty, if nothing it will postpone the time when it enters into force.

There is a second explanation – that it´s just a cover for his political backdown. After the Irish clear yeas (albeit on the second try) and the complete ratification in Poland, the Czech Republic is the only country blocking the Treaty. Political pressure is mounting. The Czech president has few reasons to expert that the Constitutional Court will proclaim anything else than the compliance of the Treaty with the Czech legal order. Even worse it seems that the public opinion is turning against him. And Klaus really cares about his popularity. Therefore he needs to find a way to score politically even if backing down. Beneš Decrees and demands of Sudeten Germans are among the strongest historic-political traumas of the Czechs – so they provide a good cover.

And finally, it is possible that Klaus actually does not want to be the “sole defender” of national sovereignty against the hordes of eurofederalists, waiting bravely for his ideological brothers from the UK Conservative Party. His interest is much narrower – for some reason he really fears that Sudeten Germans could get through the European court something, which they would demand in vain from Czech courts (which is, actually, an interesting illustration of his opinion on the “impartiality of justice”). So he is using political blackmail to get necessary assurances.

In fact, there are several reasons why the last scenario looks the most plausible one. First, if he only wants to hold back the process till spring 2010, he would not need any “footnote” – at least not now. He is sufficiently politically covered by the appeal on the Constitutional Court. Then, let´s suppose that the EU leaders would fulfil his demand on the October summit – his position would in fact weaken. He has revealed his cards, got what he wanted, now he should sign the pact.

The second indication is his Friday reaction. Swedish PM said to media on Thursday that he had a telephone call from President Klaus, who has demanded some unspecified “footnote” regarding the Charter. Immediately speculations arose. Then, on Friday, Czech president calls the press conference and reveals his cards. Obviously angered he says that the PM Reinfeldt has disclosed their private conversation, therefore he has to put cards on the table. It seems as if he was first planning to prepare ground among the EU leaders and only then go public with his demand.

Whatever the reason, blocking the Lisbon Treaty is getting more and more unsustainable for Klaus. It seems characteristic that this vocal “eurosceptic” drags into his fight against the document, which should bring Europe even closer, ghosts from the past, when Europe was tragically divided.

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Hail the King!

Posted by Radovan Geist on 07/10/09

Hardly any European politician could claim that the future of the European integration rests upon his single-handed, personal decision. For now, Czech president could. (Let´s suppose that his Polish counterpart stands by his word and signs the Lisbon Treaty after positive Irish referendum). If the Lisbon Treaty creates the post of the EU President, elected for 2.5 years, its ratification process has “created” a post of the European monarch (albeit only for few months). Vaclav Klaus clearly enjoys this position. Even more – he is not irrational, but calculating. And he knows that there are slender chances he could other than win.

First, even if the Czech constitutional order does not prevent him to sign the Treaty at this very moment, the decision of the Constitutional Court to accept petition of the group of senators gives him sufficient political clout to hold his pen for few more months and still claim that he is doing that out of his respect for “democracy”.

Second, there is very little that other European politicians or institutions could do to influence his decision. Vaclav Klaus does not obviously have any European political ambition, so he does not mind being an “outsider” on the European political scene. From his point of view, the more pressure from “Europe” the better. First, he looks like the only “authentic” defender of Czech “national” interests, with very consequent positions. Second, pressure and harsh words, or threats of “losing the commissioner”, only seem to support his argument that the EU is trying to suppress any dissent, behaving undemocratically.

If they try t negotiate with him, offering the Czech for example some interesting post in the Commission or other sweetener, they could give him a political credit for “strengthening the Czech position” in the EU. In fact the least damaging strategy might be letting him play his political games which are mostly oriented towards Czech public and political actors.

In fact, here might lay his only weak point. If there is anything that Klaus wants, it´s popularity. According to recent polls (http://www.sanep.cz/pruzkumy/lisabonska-smlouva/) it seems that his position is losing support in the Czech public (figures at the end of this post). If nothing exceptional happens, public pressure will achieve what the European political elites never could – Klaus would gradually shift his attention on another issue, which would build his popularity, and silently sign the Treaty. The only question is whether he would still wait few more months for the decision of the Constitutional Court, or does it before that. I would bet on the former.

SANEP poll, Czech Republic

Survey carried out between 1.-.10. 2009 with 4 320 participants

How would you vote if there was a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in the Czech Republic:

For the Lisbon Treaty – 53%

Against the Lisbon Treaty – 47%

Do you think that the position of the president Vaclav Klaus, who is prolonging signature of the Lisbon Treaty, harms the position of the Czech Republic in the European Union?

Yes – 44%

No – 37%

Don´t know – 19%

Do you think that the president Klaus should sign the Lisbon Treaty without any delay?

Yes – 43%

No – 38%

Don´t know – 19%

http://www.sanep.cz/pruzkumy/lisabonska-smlouva/

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Eight miserable years

Posted by Radovan Geist on 28/09/09

The attacks from the 11^th September could have been remembered “only” as a great human tragedy; an opportunity to commemorate innocent victims of senseless violence, citizens’ solidarity which made heroes from “ordinary people”. But the way these horrific events were misused by some governments leaves a bitter taste.

Official (from “Western” point of view) interpretation of the 09/11 events lays on the assumption that these attacked had started something qualitatively new in the international arena, that they have started the series of reactions, which might have been partly wrong, or exaggerated, but were primarily caused by those terrorist acts. Let us set aside all the “conspiracy theories” (which are nevertheless surprisingly strong even in “subaltern” discourse in the West). In fact, the idea of “point zero”, which had started everything that followed in those eight miserable years, is problematic enough. Even more questionable are the reactions of the US and some other governments, officially motivated by the ambition to prevent repetition of such disaster.

In fact, US political elite decided intentionally to make 9/11 a “breakpoint” and could do it thanks to its political context. Unquestionably, an attack in the heart of the only global superpower which invested in its defence more than all the others together was an emotional shock to its citizens. Even if the attacks were militarily insignificant, they were unpleasant reminders that event the strongest is not completely immune from negative effects of their deeds in the interconnected world. That helped the US political establishment to unleash its radical foreign policy. Imperial policy, concept of pre-emptive wars, flexible alliances… were undermining the international law and alliance limitations with the ultimate aim of shoring-up the US hegemonic power (at the same time, this policy had complex internal political aims). Frightened public was fed with images of dangerous enemies, so that it was ready to accept limitations to its freedoms and horrors of massacres unleashed in the far-off regions, in the name of “national security”.

The narratives of “war against terrorism” served also many other authoritarian, quasi-democratic and presumably democratic regimes, which wanted to tighten screws on their internal opposition or regional separatism. This way, Russia started to “solve” its problems in Chechnya; China is silencing Uyghur discontent, India is pacifying Kashmir, regimes in Middle East of Central Asia could “tidy-up” its opposition…

The European countries liked to play the role of “moral voice”. Unfortunately, many critics disliked rather the US leadership than the “war against terrorism” as such. Some of them readily forgot their tragic experience of colonization and joined the US adventures; some did it (mostly in Central and Eastern Europe) because of blind ideological triumphalism, or as a part of cynical political calculation. (For example, in 2003 some in Slovakia argued that we should join the US invasion to Iraq to show that we will be a “responsible NATO member”. Only later was the official PR trying to suppress such reasoning, because of high unpopularity of Iraq war.) But the complicity of the European governments in these eight years of misery is even more visible in the internal policies. Politics of mistrust and xenophobia joined the weakening of social state´s institutions and capacities (which is part of another story) and seriously damaged fragile construction of multi-cultural societies.

Results of the policies applied during eight years after 9/11 are miserable. West did not manage to “win” (in its own, official terms) either of the wars started in the name of “fight against terrorism”. A hundred thousand dead Iraqis (just to rely on unreliable official figures) and unknown tens of thousands dead Afghanis did not make this world a safer or better place. We were “ready to pay this price” just to find out the well-known truth – it is impossible to gain the “minds and hearts” of people, even more to build a “democratic and stable country”, with bombs, night raids and attacks on civilians. If you are living in “non-Western” part of the world, it was never easier to be “anti-Western”. Secret jails, humiliation and torture, bombed wedding parties, etc had destroyed the image of “white man” as effectively as the horrors of colonialism.

In fact, the so-called “war against terrorism” looks just like that – another attempt to rationalize the global inequality; to marry the official rhetoric of “democracy, freedom and human rights” with unscrupulous assertion of individual economic and political interests.

At the sunset of the colonial age, Franz Fanon was announcing the end of the European world in his book Wretched of the Earth: “Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their own streets, in all the corners of the globe. For centuries they have stifled almost the whole of humanity in the name of a so-called spiritual experience.” However, Euro-centric world proved to me more resilient, only the centre of power mover westward. But the world is approaching another break-point. Economic crisis weakened the economic and ideological hegemony of the “West” and increasing pressure of the emerging new powers will force on us a more-balanced international order. The “war against terrorism” showed that we are not morally competent, nor strong enough, to claim the “global leadership”. Discussions between “doves” and “hawks” (once illustrated as a completely artificial division between the “Americans from Mars” and “Europeans from Venus”) on how to lead the world, are becoming useless. It is too late to discuss how to use our dominant power. It´s high time we learn how to share it.

Political, economic and ideological dominance of our part of the world is disintegrating. We could only hope that the new actors aspiring for share on power will change the global system less brutally than the West did it once. The world system could be transformed gradually, in a general peaceful way, or abruptly and brutally – it also depends on us. Let us take lessons from the past eight miserable years.

This text is a re-worked article that appeared first in the weekly Žurnál (in Slovak)

English, Foreign Affairs, Slovak
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New dividing lines

Posted by Radovan Geist on 28/09/09

This week will be important not only for the Lisbon Treaty, or future of institutional reform, but for the European integration process as we know it. Few would argue that the EU could go for long with its current institutional settings and policies. For those who think that the post-war European integration was an important social innovation, the Lisbon Treaty represents (however imperfect) chance to continue with the project which managed to weaken boundaries, whichwere historically dividing countries and societies.

The European integration has never been a teleological process, leading to some predetermined “final state”. Nor is it a result of some dark conspiracy. Political decisions that formed integration on the European continent were first and foremost responses to political and economic challenges in Europe and globally, shaped by the prevailing ideologies and political narratives.

The strength of the European integration lies in the way it has changed the traditional, “Westphalian” logic of the European politics, with the consent and support of the great majority of Europe’s political actors. The Wesphalian system was based on the existence of borders, clearly separating internal and external political space. Even though it was originally designed to limit the conflict between rulers by placing territorial limits on their power, it did not prevent wars and actually cemented the division of Europe into sovereign states which cooperate or enter into conflict according to their “national interests”. When mixed with the ideology of modern nationalism in the 19^th century, it inflamed the continent, triggered the destructive wars, and fueled conflict on a global scale.

Integration was an important social innovation, reaction on horrors that Europe suffered in the 20^th century – especially the two world wars, and economic crises of the first decades of 20^th century. Economic crises and extreme nationalism showed the need of grater regulation in the international economic relations. Similarly as the European social model, integration process was reacting on the systemic flaws of unregulated capitalism. Thanks to that Europe has lived through the unprecedented period of peace and prosperity and has even managed to integrate some of the states on its periphery (even if this is still far from complete). “National” economic and political structures were harmonized and integrated to the level where in most cases cooperation brings higher rewards than conflict.

European integration after World War Two was able to soften such dividing lines, internally and externally. Borders are generally no longer seen as natural and absolute, but as political constructions marking the current (or past) balance of powers and defining our “foreign-ness”. But this also implies the possibility of deconstructing them by renegotiating the power relations and gradually altering the self-definition of the political entity concerned. While Westphalian Europe dealt with differences (ethnic, religious and ideological, cultural, and economic) by creating boundaries, European integration tries to transcend them: externally, by integrating the states on its periphery (which does not have to mean EU membership status); internally, by creating common rules and merging decision-making processes in an ever-wider range of policy areas.

Using the words of Karl Deutsch, the German-American social and political scientist, this integration is brought about by the improving quality and intensity of communication between states and societies. The fruit of this process is the exclusion of war and violence as a means of settling conflicts. This suggests that inadequate rules and poor coordination do not create space for mutually beneficial competition but, rather, provoke mistrust at the level both of the political elites and general public.

Without further reforms of its institutions and policies, the EU will not be able to continue on this path. I doubt that it would cause the “big integration crunch”, or return to the pure common market with “sovereign states”, something that part of the “eurosceptic” camp would dream of. Instead the EU would go through the period of stagnation, and “ever-worse” cooperation, ultimately disintegrating into groups of countries cooperating in different political areas. Even if these groups overlap, the whole system would have a core and periphery, replicating the Westphalian logic of territorial spheres of influence. The costs of “free-rider” strategies (both economic and political) would decrease as well as general trust and willingness to cooperate. In short – weaker Europe might create larger room for “maneuver” for individual governments, but in most of the cases, they would be able to use that maneuvering only to reap larger piece of diminishing cake, than to influence our global political and economic environment.

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