This week will be important not only for the Lisbon Treaty, or future of institutional reform, but for the European integration process as we know it. Few would argue that the EU could go for long with its current institutional settings and policies. For those who think that the post-war European integration was an important social innovation, the Lisbon Treaty represents (however imperfect) chance to continue with the project which managed to weaken boundaries, whichwere historically dividing countries and societies.

The European integration has never been a teleological process, leading to some predetermined “final state”. Nor is it a result of some dark conspiracy. Political decisions that formed integration on the European continent were first and foremost responses to political and economic challenges in Europe and globally, shaped by the prevailing ideologies and political narratives.

The strength of the European integration lies in the way it has changed the traditional, “Westphalian” logic of the European politics, with the consent and support of the great majority of Europe’s political actors. The Wesphalian system was based on the existence of borders, clearly separating internal and external political space. Even though it was originally designed to limit the conflict between rulers by placing territorial limits on their power, it did not prevent wars and actually cemented the division of Europe into sovereign states which cooperate or enter into conflict according to their “national interests”. When mixed with the ideology of modern nationalism in the 19^th century, it inflamed the continent, triggered the destructive wars, and fueled conflict on a global scale.

Integration was an important social innovation, reaction on horrors that Europe suffered in the 20^th century – especially the two world wars, and economic crises of the first decades of 20^th century. Economic crises and extreme nationalism showed the need of grater regulation in the international economic relations. Similarly as the European social model, integration process was reacting on the systemic flaws of unregulated capitalism. Thanks to that Europe has lived through the unprecedented period of peace and prosperity and has even managed to integrate some of the states on its periphery (even if this is still far from complete). “National” economic and political structures were harmonized and integrated to the level where in most cases cooperation brings higher rewards than conflict.

European integration after World War Two was able to soften such dividing lines, internally and externally. Borders are generally no longer seen as natural and absolute, but as political constructions marking the current (or past) balance of powers and defining our “foreign-ness”. But this also implies the possibility of deconstructing them by renegotiating the power relations and gradually altering the self-definition of the political entity concerned. While Westphalian Europe dealt with differences (ethnic, religious and ideological, cultural, and economic) by creating boundaries, European integration tries to transcend them: externally, by integrating the states on its periphery (which does not have to mean EU membership status); internally, by creating common rules and merging decision-making processes in an ever-wider range of policy areas.

Using the words of Karl Deutsch, the German-American social and political scientist, this integration is brought about by the improving quality and intensity of communication between states and societies. The fruit of this process is the exclusion of war and violence as a means of settling conflicts. This suggests that inadequate rules and poor coordination do not create space for mutually beneficial competition but, rather, provoke mistrust at the level both of the political elites and general public.

Without further reforms of its institutions and policies, the EU will not be able to continue on this path. I doubt that it would cause the “big integration crunch”, or return to the pure common market with “sovereign states”, something that part of the “eurosceptic” camp would dream of. Instead the EU would go through the period of stagnation, and “ever-worse” cooperation, ultimately disintegrating into groups of countries cooperating in different political areas. Even if these groups overlap, the whole system would have a core and periphery, replicating the Westphalian logic of territorial spheres of influence. The costs of “free-rider” strategies (both economic and political) would decrease as well as general trust and willingness to cooperate. In short – weaker Europe might create larger room for “maneuver” for individual governments, but in most of the cases, they would be able to use that maneuvering only to reap larger piece of diminishing cake, than to influence our global political and economic environment.